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Abstract—This paper presents models and algorithms for
interactive sensing in social networks where individuals
act as sensors and the information exchange between
individuals is exploited to optimize sensing. Social learning
is used to model the interaction between individuals that
aim to estimate an underlying state of nature. In this
context the following questions are addressed: How can self-
interested agents that interact via social learning achieve a
tradeoff between individual privacy and reputation of the
social group? How can protocols be designed to prevent
data incest in online reputation blogs where individuals
make recommendations? How can sensing by individuals
that interact with each other be used by a global decision
maker to detect changes in the underlying state of nature?
When individual agents possess limited sensing, compu-
tation and communication capabilities, can a network of
agents achieve sophisticated global behavior? Social and
game theoretic learning are natural settings for addressing
these questions. This article presents an overview, insights
and discussion of social learning models in the context of
data incest propagation, change detection and coordination
of decision making.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The proliferation of social media such as real time
microblogging services (Twitter1), online reputation and
rating systems (YELP) together with app-enabled smart-
phones, facilitate real time sensing of social activities,
social patterns and behavior.
Social sensing, also called participatory sensing [1],
[2], [3], [4], is defined as a process where physical
sensors present in mobile devices such as GPS are used
to infer social relationships and human activities. In this
paper, we work at a higher level of abstraction. We use
the term social sensor or human-based sensor to denote
an agent that provides information about its environment
(state of nature) on a social network after interaction with
other agents. Examples of such social sensors include
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1On US Presidential election day in 2012, there were 15 thousand
tweets per second resulting in 500 million tweets in the day. Twitter
can be considered as a real time sensor.
Twitter posts, Facebook status updates, and ratings on
online reputation systems like YELP and Tripadvisor.
Such social sensors go beyond physical sensors for social
sensing. For example [5], user opinions/ratings (such as
the quality of a restaurant) are available on Tripadvisor
but are difficult to measure via physical sensors. Simi-
larly, future situations revealed by the Facebook status of
a user are impossible to predict using physical sensors.
Statistical inference using social sensors is relevant
in a variety of applications including localizing special
events for targeted advertising [6], [7], marketing [8],
localization of natural disasters [9] and predicting sen-
timent of investors in financial markets [10], [11]. It is
demonstrated in [12] that models built from the rate of
tweets for particular products can outperform market-
based predictors. However, social sensors present unique
challenges from a statistical estimation point of view.
First, social sensors interact with and influence other
social sensors. For example, ratings posted on online
reputation systems strongly influence the behaviour of
individuals.2 Such interacting sensing can result in non-
standard information patterns due to correlations intro-
duced by the structure of the underlying social network.
Second, due to privacy reasons and time-constraints,
social sensors typically do not reveal raw observations
of the underlying state of nature. Instead, they reveal
their decisions (ratings, recommendations, votes) which
can be viewed as a low resolution (quantized) function
of their raw measurements and interactions with other
social sensors.
As is apparent from the above discussion, there is
strong motivation to construct mathematical models that
capture the dynamics of interactive sensing involving
social sensors. Such models facilitate understanding the
dynamics of information flow in social networks and
therefore the design of algorithms that can exploit these
dynamics to estimate the underlying state of nature.
In this paper, social learning [15], [16], [17] serves
as a useful mathematical abstraction for modelling the
interaction of social sensors. Social learning in multi-
agent systems seeks to answer the following question:
2It is reported in [13] that 81% of hotel managers regularly check
Tripadvisor reviews. [14] reports that a one-star increase in the Yelp
rating maps to 5-9 % revenue increase.
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How do decisions made by agents affect deci-
sions made by subsequent agents?
In social learning, each agent chooses its action by opti-
mizing its local utility function. Subsequent agents then
use their private observations together with the actions of
previous agents to estimate (learn) an underlying state.
The setup is fundamentally different to classical signal
processing in which sensors use noisy observations to
compute estimates - in social learning agents use noisy
observations together with decisions made by previous
agents, to estimate the underlying state of nature.
In the last decade, social learning has been used
widely in economics, marketing, political science and
sociology to model the behavior of financial markets,
crowds, social groups and social networks; see [15], [16],
[18], [17], [19], [20] and numerous references therein.
Related models have been studied in the context of
sequential decision making in information theory [21],
[22] and statistical signal processing [23], [24] in the
electrical engineering literature.
Social learning models for interactive sensing can
predict unusual behavior. Indeed, a key result in social
learning of an underlying random variable is that rational
agents eventually herd [16], that is, they eventually
end up choosing the same action irrespective of their
private observations. As a result, the actions contain no
information about the private observations and so the
Bayesian estimate of the underlying random variable
freezes. For a multi-agent sensing system, such behavior
can be undesirable, particularly if individuals herd and
make incorrect decisions.
Main Results and Organization
In the context of social learning models for interactive
sensing, the main ideas and organization of this paper are
as follows:
1. Social Learning Protocol: Sec.II presents a formula-
tion and survey of the classical Bayesian social learning
model which forms the mathematical basis for modelling
interactive sensing amongst humans. We illustrate the
social learning model in the context of Bayesian signal
processing (for easy access to an electrical engineering
audience). We then address how self-interested agents
performing social learning can achieve useful behavior
in terms of optimizing a social welfare function. Such
problems are motivated by privacy issues in sensing.
If an agent reveals less information in its decisions, it
maintains its privacy; on the other hand as part of a social
group it has an incentive to optimize a social welfare
function that helps estimate the state of nature.
2. Data Incest in Online Reputation Systems: Sec.III
deals with the question: How can data incest (misinfor-
mation propagation) be prevented in online reputation
blogs where social sensors make recommendations?
In the classical social learning model, each agent
acts once in a pre-determined order. However, in online
reputation systems such as Yelp or Tripadvisor which
maintain logs of votes (actions) by agents, social learning
takes place with information exchange over a loopy
graph (where the agents form the vertices of the graph).
Due to the loops in the information exchange graph,
data incest (mis-information) can propagate: Suppose an
agent wrote a poor rating of a restaurant on a social
media site. Another agent is influenced by this rating,
visits the restaurant, and then also gives a poor rating
on the social media site. The first agent visits the social
media site and notices that another agent has also given
the restaurant a poor rating - this double confirms her
rating and she enters another poor rating.
In a fair reputation system, such “double counting” or
data incest should have been prevented by making the
first agent aware that the rating of the second agent was
influenced by her own rating. Data incest results in a
bias in the estimate of state of nature. How can auto-
mated protocols be designed to prevent data incest and
thereby maintain a fair3 online reputation system? Sec.III
describes how the administrator of a social network can
maintain an unbiased (fair) reputation system.
3. Interaction of Local and Global Decision Makers for
Change Detection: Sec.IV deals with the question: In
sensing where individual agents perform social learning
to estimate an underlying state of nature, how can
changes in the state of nature be detected? Sec.IV con-
siders a sensing problem that involves change detection.
Such sensing problems arise in a variety of applications
such as financial trading where individuals react to fi-
nancial shocks [25]; marketing and advertising [26], [27]
where consumers react to a new product; and localization
of natural disasters (earthquake and typhoons) [9].
For example, consider measurement of the adoption
of a new product using a micro-blogging platform like
twitter. The adoption of the technology diffuses through
the market but its effects can only be observed through
the tweets of select members of the population. These
selected members act as sensors for the parameter of
interest. Suppose the state of nature suddenly changes
due to a sudden market shock or presence of a new
competitor. Based on the local actions of the multi-
agent system that is performing social learning, a global
decision maker (such as a market monitor or technology
3Maintaining fair reputation systems has financial implications as is
apparent from footnote 2.
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manufacturer) needs to decide whether or not to declare
if a change has occurred. How can the global decision
maker achieve such change detection to minimize a cost
function comprised of false alarm rate and delay penalty?
The local and global decision makers interact, since the
local decisions determine the posterior distribution of
subsequent agents which determines the global decision
(stop or continue) which determines subsequent local
decisions. We show that this social learning based change
detection problem leads to unusual behavior. The opti-
mal decision policy of the stopping time problem has
multiple thresholds. This is unusual: if it is optimal to
declare that a change has occurred based on the posterior
probability of change, it may not be optimal to declare
a change when the posterior probability of change is
higher!
4. Coordination of Decisions as a Non-cooperative
Game: No discussion on social learning would be com-
plete without mentioning game-theoretic methods. A
large body of research on social networks has been
devoted to the diffusion of information (e.g., ideas,
behaviors, trends) [28], [29], and particularly on finding
a set of target nodes so as to maximize the spread
of a given product [30], [31]. Often customers end up
choosing a specific product among several competitors.
A natural approach to model this competitive process is
via the use of non-cooperative game theory [32], [33].
Game theory has traditionally been used in economics
and social sciences with a focus on fully rational in-
teractions where strong assumptions are made on the
information patterns available to individual agents. In
comparison, social sensors are agents with partial in-
formation and it is the dynamic interactions between
agents that is of interest. This motivates the need for
game theoretic learning models for agents interacting in
social networks.
Sec.V deals with the question: When individuals are
self-interested and possess limited sensing, computation
and communication capabilities, can a network (social
group) of sensors whose utility functions interact achieve
sophisticated global behavior? In Sec.V, we discuss a
non-cooperative game theoretic learning approach for
adaptive decision making in social networks. This can
be viewed as a non-Bayesian version of social learn-
ing, The aim is to ensure that all agents eventually
choose actions from a common polytope of randomized
strategies - namely, the set of correlated equilibria of a
non-cooperative game. Correlated equilibria are a gen-
eralization of Nash equilibria and were introduced by
Aumann [34].4
Perspective
The social learning and game-theoretic learning for-
malisms mentioned above can be used either as descrip-
tive tools, to predict the outcome of complex interactions
amongst agents in sensing, or as prescriptive tools, to
design social networks and sensing systems around given
interaction rules. Information aggregation, misinforma-
tion propagation and privacy are important issues in
sensing using social sensors. In this paper, we treat
these issues in a highly stylized manner so as to provide
easy accessibility to an electrical engineering audience.
The underlying tools used in this paper are widely used
by the electrical engineering research community in the
areas of signal processing, control, information theory
and network communications.
In Bayesian estimation, the twin effects of so-
cial learning (information aggregation with interaction
amongst agents) and data incest (misinformation prop-
agation) lead to non-standard information patterns in
estimating the underlying state of nature. Herding occurs
when the public belief overrides the private observations
and thus actions of agents are independent of their
private observations. Data incest results in bias in the
public belief as a consequence of the unintentional re-
use of identical actions in the formation of public belief
in social learning; the information gathered by each agent
is mistakenly considered to be independent. This results
in overconfidence and bias in estimates of the state of
nature.
Privacy issues impose important constraints on social
sensors. Typically, individuals are not willing to disclose
private observations. Optimizing interactive sensing with
privacy constraints is an important problem. Privacy
and trust pose conflicting requirements on human-based
sensing: privacy requirements result in noisier measure-
ments or lower resolution actions, while maintaining a
high degree of trust (reputation) requires accurate mea-
surements. Utility functions, noisy private measurements
and quantized actions are essential ingredients of the
social and game-theoretic learning models presented in
this paper that facilitate modelling this tradeoff between
reputation and privacy.
4Aumann’s 2005 Nobel prize in economics press release reads:
“Aumann also introduced a new equilibrium concept, correlated equi-
librium, which is weaker than Nash equilibrium, the solution concept
developed by John Nash, an economics laureate in 1994. Correlated
equilibrium can explain why it may be advantageous for negotiating
parties to allow an impartial mediator to speak to the parties either
jointly or separately ...”
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The literature in the areas of social learning, sensing
and networking is extensive. Due to page restrictions,
in each of the following sections, we provide only a
brief review of relevant works. Seminal books in social
networks include [35], [36]. The book [17] contains
a complete treatment of social learning models with
several remarkable insights. For further references, we
refer the reader to [37], [38], [39], [40], [41]. In [42],
a nice description is given of how, if individual agents
deploy simple heuristics, the global system behavior
can achieve ”rational” behavior. The related problem
of achieving coherence (i.e., agents eventually choosing
the same action or the same decision policy) among
disparate sensors of decision agents without cooperation
has also witnessed intense research; see [43] and [44].
Non-Bayesian social learning models are also studied in
[45], [46].
II. MULTI-AGENT SOCIAL LEARNING
This section starts with a brief description of the
classical social learning model. In this paper, we use
social learning as the mathematical basis for modelling
interaction of social sensors. A key result in social
learning is that rational agents eventually herd, that is,
they pick the same action irrespective of their private
observation and social learning stops. To delay the effect
of herding, and thereby enhance social learning, Cham-
ley [17] (see also [47] for related work) has proposed a
novel constrained optimal social learning protocol. We
review this protocol which is formulated as a sequential
stopping time problem. We show that the constrained
optimal social learning proposed by Chamley [17] has
a threshold switching curve in the space of public
belief states. Thus the global decision to stop can be
implemented efficiently in a social learning model.
A. Motivation: What is social learning?
We start with a brief description of the ‘vanilla’5 social
learning model. In social learning [17], agents estimate
the underlying state of nature not only from their local
measurements, but also from the actions of previous
agents. (These previous actions were taken by agents
in response to their local measurements; therefore these
actions convey information about the underlying state).
5In typical formulations of social learning, the underlying state
is assumed to be a random variable and not a Markov chain. Our
description below is given in terms of a Markov chain since we wish
to highlight the unusual structure of the social learning filter below to
a signal processing reader who is familiar with basic ideas in Bayesian
filtering. Also we are interested in change detection problems in which
the change time distribution can be modelled as the absorption time
of a Markov chain.
As we will describe below, the state estimation update
in social learning has a drastically different structure
compared to the standard optimal filtering recursion and
can result in unusual behavior.
Consider a countable number of agents performing
social learning to estimate the state of an underlying
finite state Markov chain x. Let X = {1, 2, . . . , X}
denote a finite state space, P the transition matrix and
pi0 the initial distribution of the Markov chain.
Each agent acts once in a predetermined sequential
order indexed by k = 1, 2, . . . The index k can also be
viewed as the discrete time instant when agent k acts. A
multi-agent system seeks to estimate x0. Assume at the
beginning of iteration k, all agents have access to the
public belief pik−1 defined in Step (iv) below. The social
learning protocol proceeds as follows [16], [17]:
(i) Private Observation: At time k, agent k records
a private observation yk ∈ Y from the observation
distribution Biy = P (y|x = i), i ∈ X. Throughout this
section we assume that Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y } is finite.
(ii) Private Belief: Using the public belief pik−1 available
at time k − 1 (defined in Step (iv) below), agent k
updates its private posterior belief ηk(i) = P (xk =
i|a1, . . . , ak−1, yk) as the following Bayesian update
(this is the classical Hidden Markov Model filter [48]):
ηk =
BykP
′pi
1′XByP ′pi
, Byk = diag(P (yk|x = i), i ∈ X).
(1)
Here 1X denotes the X-dimensional vector of ones, ηk
is an X-dimensional probability mass function (pmf) and
P ′ denotes transpose of the matrix P .
(iii) Myopic Action: Agent k takes action ak ∈ A =
{1, 2, . . . , A} to minimize its expected cost
ak = arg min
a∈A
E{c(x, a)|a1, . . . , ak−1, yk}
= arg min
a∈A
{c′aηk}. (2)
Here ca = (c(i, a), i ∈ X) denotes an X dimensional
cost vector, and c(i, a) denotes the cost incurred when
the underlying state is i and the agent chooses action a.
Agent k then broadcasts its action ak to subsequent
agents.
(iv) Social Learning Filter: Given the action ak of agent
k, and the public belief pik−1, each subsequent agent
k′ > k performs social learning to compute the public
belief pik according to the following “social learning
filter”:
pik = T (pik−1, ak), where T (pi, a) =
RpiaP
′pi
σ(pi, a)
, (3)
4
Sensor 1 Sensor 2 Sensor 3
y1 y2 y3
a1 a2 a3
State x ∼ pi0
Fig. 1. Information Exchange Structure in Social Learning
and σ(pi, a) = 1′XR
pi
aP
′pi is the normalization factor of
the Bayesian update. In (3), the public belief pik(i) =
P (xk = i|a1, . . . ak) and Rpia = diag(P (a|x = i, pi), i ∈
X) has elements
P (ak = a|xk = i, pik−1 = pi) =
∑
y∈Y
P (a|y, pi)P (y|xk = i)
(4)
P (ak = a|y, pi) =
{
1 if c′aByP
′pi ≤ c′a˜ByP ′pi, a˜ ∈ A
0 otherwise.
The derivation of the social learning filter (3) is given in
the discussion below.
B. Discussion
Let us pause to give some intuition about the above
social learning protocol.
1. Information Exchange Structure: Fig.1 illustrates the
above social learning protocol in which the information
exchange is sequential. Agents send their hard decisions
(actions) to subsequent agents. In the social learning
protocol we have assumed that each agent acts once.
Another way of viewing the social learning protocol is
that there are finitely many agents that act repeatedly in
some pre-defined order. If each agent chooses its local
decision using the current public belief, then the setting
is identical to the social learning setup. We also refer the
reader to [18] for several recent results in social learning
over several types of network adjacency matrices.
2. Filtering with Hard Decisions: Social learning can be
viewed as agents making hard decision estimates at each
time and sending these estimates to subsequent agents. In
conventional Bayesian state estimation, a soft decision is
made, namely, the posterior distribution (or equivalently,
observation) is sent to subsequent agents. For example,
if A = X, and the costs are chosen as ca = −ea where
ea denotes the unit indicator with 1 in the a-th position,
then argmina c
′
api = argmaxa pi(a), i.e., the maximum
aposteriori probability (MAP) state estimate. For this
example, social learning is equivalent to agents sending
the hard MAP estimates to subsequent agents.
Note that rather than sending a hard decision estimate,
if each agent chooses its action ak = yk (that is
agents send their private observations), then the right-
hand side of (4) becomes
∑
y∈Y I(y = yk)P (y|xk =
i) = P (yk|xk = i) and so the problem becomes a
standard Bayesian filtering problem.
4. Dependence of Observation Likelihood on Prior:
The most unusual feature of the above protocol (to a
signal processing audience) is the social learning filter
(3). In standard state estimation via a Bayesian filter,
the observation likelihood given the state is completely
parametrized by the observation noise distribution and is
functionally independent of the current prior distribution.
In the social learning filter, the likelihood of the action
given the state (which is denoted by Rpia ) is an explicit
function of the prior pi! Not only does the action likeli-
hood depend on the prior, but it is also a discontinuous
function, due to the presence of the argmin in (2).
5. Derivation of Social Learning Filter: The derivation
of the social learning filter (3) is as follows: Define the
posterior as pik(j) = P (xk = j|a1, . . . , ak). Then
pik(j) =
1
σ(pik−1, ak)
P (ak|xk = j, a1, . . . , ak−1)∑
i
P (xk = j|xk−1 = i)P (xk−1 = i|a1, . . . , ak−1)
=
1
σ(pik−1, ak)
∑
y
P (ak|yk = y, a1, . . . , ak−1)
P (yk = y|xk = j)
∑
i
P (xk = j|xk−1 = i)pik−1(i)
=
1
σ(pik−1, ak)
∑
y
P (ak|yk = y, pik−1)
P (yk = y|xk = j)
∑
i
Pijpik−1(i)
where the normalization term is
σ(pik−1, ak) =
∑
j
∑
y
P (ak|yk = y, pik−1)
P (yk = y|xk = j)
∑
i
Pijpik−1(i).
The above social learning protocol and social learning
filter (3) result in interesting dynamics in state estimation
and decision making. We will illustrate two interesting
consequences that are unusual to an electrical engineer-
ing audience:
• Rational Agents form herds and information cas-
cades and blindly follow previous agents. This is
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discussed in Sec.II-C below.
• Making global decisions on change detection in
a multi-agent system performing social learning
results in multi-threshold behavior. This is discussed
in Sec.IV below.
C. Rational Agents form Information Cascades
The first consequence of the unusual nature of the
social learning filter (3) is that social learning can
result in multiple rational agents taking the same action
independently of their observations. To illustrate this
behavior, throughout this subsection, we assume that x
is a finite state random variable (instead of a Markov
chain) with prior distribution pi0.
We start with the following definitions; see also [17]:
• An individual agent k herds on the public belief
pik−1 if it chooses its action ak = a(pik−1, yk) in
(2) independently of its observation yk.
• A herd of agents takes place at time k¯, if the actions
of all agents after time k¯ are identical, i.e., ak = ak¯
for all time k > k¯.
• An information cascade occurs at time k¯, if the
public beliefs of all agents after time k¯ are identical,
i.e. pik = pik¯ for all k < k¯.
Note that if an information cascade occurs, then since
the public belief freezes, social learning ceases. Also
from the above definitions it is clear that an information
cascade implies a herd of agents, but the reverse is not
true; see Sec.IV-C for an example.
The following result which is well known in the
economics literature [16], [17] states that if agents follow
the above social learning protocol, then after some finite
time k¯, an information cascade occurs.6 The proof
follows via an elementary application of the martingale
convergence theorem.
Theorem 2.1 ([16]): The social learning protocol de-
scribed in Sec.II-A leads to an information cascade in
6A nice analogy is provided in [17]. If I see someone walking down
the street with an umbrella, I assume (based on rationality) that he
has checked the weather forecast and is carrying an umbrella since
it might rain. Therefore, I also take an umbrella. So now there are
two people walking down the street carrying umbrellas. A third person
sees two people with umbrellas and based on the same inference logic,
also takes an umbrella. Even though each individual is rational, such
herding behavior might be irrational since the first person who took
the umbrella, may not have checked the weather forecast.
Another example is that of patrons who decide to choose a
restaurant. Despite their menu preferences, each patron chooses the
restaurant with the most customers. So eventually all patrons herd to
one restaurant.
[8] quotes the following anecdote on user influence in a social
network which can be interpreted as herding: “... when a popular
blogger left his blogging site for a two-week vacation, the site’s visitor
tally fell, and content produced by three invited substitute bloggers
could not stem the decline.”
finite time with probability 1. That is there exists a finite
time k¯ after which social learning ceases, i.e., public
belief pik+1 = pik, k ≥ k¯, and all agents choose the
same action, i.e., ak+1 = ak, k ≥ k¯. 
Instead of reproducing the proof, let us give some
insight as to why Theorem 2.1 holds. It can be shown
using martingale methods that at some finite time k =
k∗, the agent’s probability P (ak|yk, pik−1) becomes in-
dependent of the private observation yk. Then clearly
from (4), P (ak = a|xk = i, pik−1) = P (ak = a|pi).
Substituting this into the social learning filter (3), we
see that pik = pik−1. Thus after some finite time k∗,
the social learning filter hits a fixed point and social
learning stops. As a result, all subsequent agents k > k∗
completely disregard their private observations and take
the same action ak∗ , thereby forming an information
cascade (and therefore a herd).
D. Constrained Interactive Sensing: Individual Privacy
vs Group Reputation
The above social learning protocol can be interpreted
as follows. Agents seek to estimate an underlying state
of nature but reveal their actions by maximizing their
privacy according to the optimization (2). This leads to
an information cascade and social learning stops. In other
words, agents are interested in optimizing their own costs
(such as maximizing privacy) and ignore the information
benefits their action provides to others.
1) Partially Observed Markov Decision Process For-
mulation: We now describe an optimized social learning
procedure that delays herding.7 This approach, see [17]
for an excellent discussion, is motivated by the following
question: How can agents assist social learning by choos-
ing their actions to trade off individual privacy (local
costs) with optimizing the reputation8 of the entire social
group?
Suppose agents seek to maximize the reputation of
their social group by minimizing the following social
welfare cost involving all agents in the social group
(compared to the myopic objective (2) used in standard
social learning):
Jµ(pi0) = E
µ
pi0
{ ∞∑
k=1
ρk−1c′a(pik−1,yk,µ(pik−1))ηk
}
(5)
7In the restaurant problem, an obvious approach to prevent herding is
as follows. If a restaurant knew that patrons choose the restaurant with
the most customers, then the restaurant could deliberately pay actors
to sit in the restaurant so that it appears popular thereby attracting
customers. The methodology in this section where herding is delayed
by benevolent agents is a different approach.
8[49], [50] contain lucid descriptions of quantitative models for trust,
reputation and privacy
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In (5), a(pi, y, µ(pi))) denotes the decision rule that
agents use to choose their actions as will be explained
below. Also ρ ∈ [0, 1) is an economic discount factor
and pi0 denotes the initial probability (prior) of the state
x. Pµpi0 and E
µ
pi0 denote the probability measure and
expectation of the evolution of the observations and
underlying state which are strategy dependent.
The key attribute of (5) is that each agent k chooses
its action according to the privacy constrained rule
ak = a(pik−1, yk, µ(pik−1)). (6)
Here, the policy
µ : pik−1 → {1, 2 . . . , L}
maps the available public belief to the set of L privacy
values. The higher the privacy value, the less the agent
reveals through its action. This is in contrast to standard
social learning (2) in which the action chosen is a(pi, y),
namely a myopic function of the private observation and
public belief.
The above formulation can be interpreted as follows:
Individual agents seek to maximize their privacy accord-
ing to social learning (6) but also seek to maximize the
reputation of their entire social group (5).
Determining the policy µ∗ that minimizes (5), and
thereby maximizes the social group reputation, is equiva-
lent to solving a stochastic control problem that is called
a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP)
problem [40], [51]. A POMDP comprises of a noisy
observed Markov chain and the dynamics of the posterior
distribution (belief state) is controlled by a policy (µ in
our case).
2) Structure of Privacy Constrained Sensing Policy:
In general, POMDPs are computationally intractable to
solve and therefore one cannot say anything useful about
the structure of the optimal policy µ∗. However, useful
insight can be obtained by considering the following
extreme case of the above problem. Suppose there are
two privacy values and each agent k chooses action
ak =
{
yk if µ(pik) = 1 (no privacy)
arg mina c
′
apik−1 if µ(pik) = 2 (full privacy).
That is, an agent either reveals its raw observation (no
privacy) or chooses its action by completely neglecting
its observation (full privacy). Once an agent chooses the
full privacy option, then all subsequent agents choose
exactly the same option and therefore herd - this follows
since each agent’s action reveals nothing about the
underlying state of nature. Therefore, for this extreme
example, determining the optimal policy µ∗(pi) is equiv-
alent to solving a stopping time problem: Determine the
earliest time for agents to herd (maintain full privacy)
subject to maximizing the social group reputation.
For such a quickest herding stopping time problem,
one can say a lot about the structure of µ∗(pi). Suppose
the sensing system wishes to determine if the state
of nature is a specific target state (say state 1). Then
[40] shows that under reasonable conditions on the
observation distribution and supermodular conditions on
the costs ([30] discusses supermodularity of influence in
social networks), the dynamic programming recursion
has a supermodular structure (see also [52], [53], [54],
[41], [55] for related results). This implies that the
optimal policy µ∗ has the following structure: There
exists a threshold curve that partitions the belief space
such that when the belief state is on one side of the curve
it is optimal for agents to reveal full observations; if the
belief state is on the other side of the curve then it is
optimal to herd. Moreover, the target state 1 belongs to
the region in which it is optimal to herd.9 This threshold
structure of the optimal policy means that if individuals
deploy the simple heuristic of
“Choose increased privacy when belief is close
to target state” ,
then the group behavior is sophisticated – herding is
delayed and accurate estimates of the state of nature can
be obtained.
III. DATA INCEST IN ONLINE REPUTATION SYSTEMS
This section generalizes the previous section by con-
sidering social learning in a social network. How can
multiple social sensors interacting over a social network
estimate an underlying state of nature? The state could
be the position coordinates of an event [9] or the quality
of a social parameter such as quality of a restaurant or
political party.
The motivation for this section can be understood in
terms of the following sensing example. Consider the
following interactions in a multi-agent social network
where agents seek to estimate an underlying state of
nature. Each agent visits a restaurant based on reviews
on an online reputation website. The agent then obtains
a private measurement of the state (e.g., the quality of
food in a restaurant) in noise. After that, he reviews the
restaurant on the same online reputation website. The
information exchange in the social network is modeled
9In standard POMDPs where agents do not perform social learning,
it is well known [56] that the set of beliefs for which it is optimal
to stop is convex. Such convexity of the herding set does not hold in
the current problem. But it is shown in [40] that the set of beliefs for
which it is optimal to herd is connected and so is the set of beliefs for
which it is optimal to reveal full observations.
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by a directed graph. As mentioned in the introduction,
data incest [57] arises due to loops in the information
exchange graph. This is illustrated in the graph of Fig.2.
Agents 1 and 2 exchange beliefs (or actions) as depicted
in Fig.2. The fact that there are two distinct paths
between Agent 1 at time 1 and Agent 1 at time 3 (these
two paths are denoted in red) implies that the information
of Agent 1 at time 1 is double counted thereby leading
to a data incest event.
Fig. 2. Example of the information flow (communication graph) in
a social network with two agents and over three event epochs. The
arrows represent exchange of information.
How can data incest be removed so that agents obtain
a fair (unbiased) estimate of the underlying state? The
methodology of this section can be interpreted in terms
of the recent Time article [58] which provides interesting
rules for online reputation systems. These include: (i)
review the reviewers, and (ii) censor fake (malicious)
reviewers. The data incest removal algorithm proposed
in this paper can be viewed as “reviewing the reviews”
of other agents to see if they are associated with data
incest or not.
The rest of this section is organized as follows:
1) Sec.III-A describes the social learning model that
is used to mimic the behavior of agents in online
reputation systems. The information exchange be-
tween agents in the social network is formulated on
a family of time dependent directed acyclic graphs.
2) In Sec.III-B, a fair reputation protocol is presented
and the criterion for achieving a fair rating is
defined.
3) Sec.III-C presents an incest removal algorithm so
that the online reputation system achieves a fair
rating. A necessary and sufficient condition is given
on the graph structure of information exchange
between agents so that a fair rating is achievable.
Related works: Collaborative recommendation sys-
tems are reviewed and studied in [59], [60]. In [61],
a model of Bayesian social learning is considered in
which agents receive private information about the state
of nature and observe actions of their neighbors in a tree-
based network. Another type of mis-information caused
by influential agents (agents who heavily affect actions
of other agents in social networks) is investigated in [18].
Mis-information in the context of this paper is motivated
by sensor networks where the term “data incest” is
used [62]. Data incest also arises in Belief Propagation
(BP) algorithms [63], [64] which are used in computer
vision and error-correcting coding theory. BP algorithms
require passing local messages over the graph (Bayesian
network) at each iteration. For graphical models with
loops, BP algorithms are only approximate due to the
over-counting of local messages [65] which is similar
to data incest in social learning. With the algorithms
presented in this section, data incest can be mitigated
from Bayesian social learning over non-tree graphs that
satisfy a topological constraint. The closest work to the
current paper is [57]. However, in [57], data incest is
considered in a network where agents exchange their
private belief states - that is, no social learning is con-
sidered. Simpler versions of this information exchange
process and estimation were investigated in [66], [67],
[68].
A. Information Exchange Graph in Social Network
Consider an online reputation system comprised of
social sensors {1, 2, . . . , S} that aim to estimate an
underlying state of nature (a random variable). Let x ∈
X = {1, 2, . . . , X} represent the state of nature (such as
the quality of a hotel) with known prior distribution pi0.
Let k = 1, 2, 3, . . . depict epochs at which events occur.
These events involve taking observations, evaluating
beliefs and choosing actions as described below. The
index k marks the historical order of events and not
necessarily absolute time. However, for simplicity, we
refer to k as “time”.
To model the information exchange in the social
network, we will use a family of directed acyclic graphs.
It is convenient also to reduce the coordinates of time k
and agent s to a single integer index n which is used to
represent agent s at time k:
n , s+S(k−1), s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, k = 1, 2, 3, . . . (7)
We refer to n as a “node” of a time dependent informa-
tion flow graph Gn that we now define.
1) Some Graph Theoretic Definitions: Let
Gn = (Vn, En), n = 1, 2, . . . (8)
denote a sequence of time-dependent graphs of infor-
mation flow in the social network until and including
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time k where n = s + S(k − 1). Each vertex in Vn
represents an agent s′ in the social network at time k′
and each edge (n′, n′′) in En ⊆ Vn × Vn shows that
the information (action) of node n′ (agent s′ at time k′)
reaches node n′′ (agent s′′ at time k′′). It is clear that
the communication graph Gn is a sub-graph of Gn+1.
This means that the diffusion of actions can be modelled
via a family of time-dependent directed acyclic graphs
(a directed graph with no directed cycles.
The algorithms below will involve specific columns
of the adjacency matrix transitive closure matrix of the
graph Gn. The Adjacency Matrix An of Gn is an n×n
matrix with elements An(i, j) given by
An(i, j) =
{
1 if (vj , vi) ∈ E ,
0 otherwise
, An(i, i) = 0. (9)
The transitive closure matrix Tn is the n× n matrix
Tn = sgn((In −An)−1) (10)
where for any matrix M , the matrix sgn(M) has ele-
ments
sgn(M)(i, j) =
{
0 if M(i, j) = 0 ,
1 if M(i, j) 6= 0.
Note that An(i, j) = 1 if there is a single hop path
between nodes i and j, In comparison, Tn(i, j) = 1 if
there exists a path (possible multi-hop) between node i
and j.
The information reaching node n depends on the
information flow graph Gn. The following two sets will
be used to specify the incest removal algorithms below:
Hn = {m : An(m,n) = 1} (11)
Fn = {m : Tn(m,n) = 1}. (12)
Thus Hn denotes the set of previous nodes m that com-
municate with node n in a single-hop. In comparison, Fn
denotes the set of previous nodes m whose information
eventually arrive at node n. Thus Fn contains all possible
multi-hop connections by which information from a node
m eventually reaches node n.
2) Example: To illustrate the above notation consider
a social network consisting of S = 2 two groups with the
following information flow graph for three time points
k = 1, 2, 3.
Fig.3 shows the nodes n = 1, 2, . . . , 6 where n =
s+ 2(k − 1).
Note that in this example, as is apparent from Fig.2,
each node remembers all its previous actions. The infor-
mation flow is characterized by the family of directed
acyclic graphs {G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6} with adjacency
1
2
3
4
5
6
Fig. 3. Example of an information flow network with S = 2 two
agents, namely s ∈ {1, 2} and time points k = 1, 2, 3. Circles
represent the nodes indexed by n = s+S(k−1) in the social network
and each edge depicts a communication link between two nodes.
matrices
A1 =
[
0
]
, A2 =
[
0 0
0 0
]
, A3 =
0 0 10 0 1
0 0 0
,
A4 =

0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , A5 =

0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
 .
Since nodes 1 and 2 do not communicate, clearly A1
and A2 are zero matrices. Nodes 1 and 3 communicate
as do nodes 2 and 3, hence A3 has two ones, etc. Finally
from (11) and (12),
H5 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, F5 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
where H5 denotes all one hop links to node 5 while F5
denotes all multihop links to node 5.
Note that An is always the upper left n×n submatrix
of An+1. Also due to causality with respect to the
time index k, the adjacency matrices are always upper
triangular.
B. Fair Online Reputation System
1) Protocol for Fair Online Reputation System: The
procedure summarized in Protocol 1 aims to evaluate
a fair reputation that uses social learning over a social
network by eliminating incest.
Aim: Our aim is to design algorithm A in the auto-
mated recommender system (13) of Protocol 1 so that
the following requirement is met:
pin−(i) = pi0n−(i), i ∈ X
where pi0n−(i) = P (x = i|{am,m ∈ Fn}). (15)
We call pi0n− in (15) the true or fair online rating
available to node n since Fn = {m : Tn(m,n) = 1}
defined in (12) denotes all information (multi-hop links)
9
Protocol 1 Incest Removal for Social Learning in an
Online Reputation System
(i) Information from Social Network:
1) Recommendation from friends: Node n receives past
actions {am,m ∈ Hn} from previous nodes m ∈
Hn in the social network. Hn is defined in (11).
2) Automated Recommender System: For these past ac-
tions {am,m ∈ Hn}, the network administrator has
already computed the public beliefs (pim,m ∈ Hn)
using Step (v) below.
The automated recommender system fuses public
beliefs (pim,m ∈ Hn), into the single recommen-
dation belief pin− as
pin− = A(pim,m ∈ Hn) (13)
The fusion algorithm A will be designed below.
(ii) Observation: Node n records private observation yn
from distribution Biy = P (y|x = i), i ∈ X.
(iii) Private Belief: Node n then uses yn and public belief
pin− to update its private belief via Bayes formula as
ηn =
Bynpin−
1′XBypin−
(14)
(iv) Myopic Action: Node n takes action
an = arg min
a
c′aηn
and inputs its action to the online reputation system.
(v) Public Belief Update by Network Administrator:
Based on action an, the network administrator (auto-
mated algorithm) computes the public belief pin using
the social learning filter (3) with P = I .
available to node n. By definition pi0n− is incest free since
it is the desired conditional probability that we want. If
algorithm A is designed so that pin−(i) satisfies (15),
then the computation (14) and Step (v) yield
ηn(i) = P (x = i|{am,m ∈ Fn}, yn), i ∈ X,
pin(i) = P (x = i|{am,m ∈ Fn}, an), i ∈ X,
which are, respectively, the correct private belief for node
n and the correct after-action public belief.
2) Discussion of Protocol 1:
(i) Data Incest: It is important to note that without
careful design of algorithm A, due to loops in the
dependencies of actions on previous actions, the public
rating pin− computed using (13) can be substantially
different from the fair online rating pi0n− of (15). As
a result, ηn computed via (14) will not be the correct
private belief and incest will propagate in the network. In
other words, ηn, pin− and pin are defined purely in terms
of their computational expressions in Protocol 1 – at
this stage they are not necessarily the desired conditional
probabilities, unless algorithm A is designed to remove
incest.
Note that instead of (13), node n could naively (and
incorrectly) assume that the public beliefs pim,m ∈ Hn
that it received are independent. It would then fuse these
public beliefs as
pin− =
∑
m∈Hn pim
1′X
∑
m∈Hn pim
. (16)
This, of course, would result in data incest.
(ii) How much does an individual remember?: The
above protocol has the flexibility of modelling cases
where either each node remembers some (or all) of its
past actions or none of its past actions. This facilitates
modelling cases in which people forget most of the past
except for specific highlights.
(iii) Automated Recommender System: Steps (i) and (v)
of Protocol 1 can be combined into an automated rec-
ommender system that maps previous actions of agents
in the social group to a single recommendation (rating)
pin− of (13). This recommender system can operate
completely opaquely to the actual user (node n). Node
n simply uses the automated rating pin− as the current
best available rating from the reputation system.
(iii) Social Influence. Informational Message vs Social
Message: In Protocol 1, it is important that each in-
dividual n deploys Algorithm A to fuse the beliefs
{pim,m ∈ Hn}; otherwise incest can propagate. Here,
Hn can be viewed as the “social message”, i.e., personal
friends of node n since they directly communicate to
node n while the associated beliefs can be viewed as
the “informational message”. The social message from
personal friends exerts a large social influence – it
provides significant incentive (peer pressure) for indi-
vidual n to comply with Protocol 1 and thereby prevent
incest. Indeed, a remarkable recent study described in
[69] shows that social messages (votes) from known
friends has significantly more influence on an individual
than the information in the messages themselves. This
study includes comparison of information messages and
social messages on Facebook and their direct effect on
voting behavior. To quote [69], “The effect of social
transmission on real-world voting was greater than the
direct effect of the messages themselves...”
(iv) Agent Reputation: The cost function minimiza-
tion in Step (iv) can be interpreted in terms of the
reputation of agents in online reputation systems. If an
agent continues to write bad reviews for high quality
restaurants on Yelp, his reputation becomes lower among
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the users. Consequently, other people ignore reviews of
that (low-reputation) agent in evaluating their opinion
about the social unit under study (restaurant). There-
fore, agents minimize the penalty of writing inaccurate
reviews (or equivalently increase their reputations) by
choosing proper actions.
(v) Think and act: Steps (ii), (iii) (iv) and (v) of Protocol
1 constitute standard social learning as described in
Sec.II-A. The key difference with standard social learn-
ing is Steps (i) performed by the network administrator.
Agents receive public beliefs from the social network
with arbitrary random delays. These delays reflect the
time an agent takes between reading the publicly avail-
able reputation and making its decision. It is typical
behavior of people to read published ratings multiple
times and then think for an arbitrary amount of time
before acting.
C. Incest Removal Algorithm in Online Reputation Sys-
tem
Below we design algorithm A in Protocol 1 so that it
yields the fair public rating pi0n− of (15).
1) Fair Rating Algorithm: It is convenient to work
with the logarithm of the un-normalized belief10; accord-
ingly define
ln(i) ∝ log pin(i), ln−(i) ∝ log pin−(i), i ∈ X.
The following theorem shows that the logarithm of
the fair rating pi0n− defined in (15) can be obtained
as linear weighted combination of the logarithms of
previous public beliefs.
Theorem 3.1 (Fair Rating Algorithm): Consider the
online reputation system running Protocol 1. Suppose
the following algorithm A(lm,m ∈ Hn) is implemented
in (13) of Protocol 1 by the network administrator:
ln−(i) = w′n l1:n−1(i)
where wn = T−1n−1tn. (17)
Then ln−(i) ∝ log pi0n−(i). That is, algorithm A com-
putes the fair rating log pi0n−(i) defined in (15).
In (17), wn is an n−1 dimensional weight vector. Recall
that tn denotes the first n−1 elements of the nth column
of transitive closure matrix Tn. 
Theorem 3.1 says that the fair rating pi0n− can be ex-
pressed as a linear function of the action log-likelihoods
10The un-normalized belief proportional to pin(i) is the numerator
of the social learning filter (3). The corresponding un-normalized
fair rating corresponding to pi0n−(i) is the joint distribution P (x =
i, {am,m ∈ Fn}). By taking logarithm of the un-normalized belief,
Bayes formula merely becomes the sum of the log likelihood and log
prior. This allows us to devise a data incest removal algorithm based
on linear combinations of the log beliefs.
in terms of the transitive closure matrix Tn of graph Gn.
This is intuitive since pi0n− can be viewed as the sum of
information collected by the nodes such that there are
paths between all these nodes and n.
2) Achievability of Fair Rating by Protocol 1: We are
not quite done!
1) On the one hand, algorithm A at node n specified
by (13) has access only to beliefs lm,m ∈ Hn
– equivalently it has access only to beliefs from
previous nodes specified by An(:, n) which denotes
the last column of the adjacency matrix An.
2) On the other hand, to provide incest free estimates,
algorithm A specified in (17) requires all previous
beliefs l1:n−1(i) that are specified by the non-zero
elements of the vector wn.
The only way to reconcile points 1 and 2 is to ensure that
An(j, n) = 0 implies wn(j) = 0 for j = 1, . . . , n − 1.
The condition means that the single hop past estimates
lm,m ∈ Hn available at node n according to (13)
in Protocol 1 provide all the information required to
compute w′n l1:n−1 in (17). This is a condition on the
information flow graph Gn. We formalize this condition
in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (Achievability of Fair Rating):
Consider the fair rating algorithm specified by (17). For
Protocol 1 with available information (pim,m ∈ Hn) to
achieve the estimates ln− of algorithm (17), a necessary
and sufficient condition on the information flow graph
Gn is
An(j, n) = 0 =⇒ wn(j) = 0. (18)
Therefore for Protocol 1 to generate incest free estimates
for nodes n = 1, 2, . . ., condition (18) needs to hold for
each n. (Recall wn is specified in (17).) 
Note that the constraint (18) is purely in terms of the
adjacency matrix An, since the transitive closure matrix
(10) is a function of the adjacency matrix.
Summary: Algorithm (17) together with the condition
(18) ensure that incest free estimates are generated by
Protocol 1.
3) Illustrative Example (continued): Let us continue
with the example of Fig.2 where we already specified
the adjacency matrices of the graphs G1, G2, G3, G4
and G5. Using (10), the transitive closure matrices Tn
obtained from the adjacency matrices are given by:
T1 =
[
1
]
, T2 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, T3 =
1 0 10 1 1
0 0 1
,
T4 =
1 0 1 10 1 1 10 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 , T5 =

1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1
.
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Note that Tn(i, j) is non-zero only for i ≥ j due to
causality since information sent by a social group can
only arrive at another social group at a later time instant.
The weight vectors are then obtained from (17) as
w2 =
[
0
]
,
w3 =
[
1 1
]′
,
w4 =
[
1 1 0
]′
,
w5 =
[−1 −1 1 1]′ .
Let us examine these weight vectors. w2 means that node
2 does not use the estimate from node 1. This formula is
consistent with the constraint information flow because
estimate from node 1 is not available to node 2; see
Fig.3. w3 means that node 3 uses estimates from node
1 and 2; w4 means that node 4 uses estimates only
from node 1 and node 2. The estimate from node 3 is
not available at node 4. As shown in Fig.3, the mis-
information propagation occurs at node 5. The vector
w5 says that node 5 adds estimates from nodes 3 and
4 and removes estimates from nodes 1 and 2 to avoid
double counting of these estimates already integrated
into estimates from node 3 and 4. Indeed, using the
algorithm (17), incest is completely prevented in this
example.
Let us now illustrate an example in which exact incest
removal is impossible. Consider the information flow
graph of Fig.3 but with the edge between node 2 and
node 5 deleted. Then A5(2, 5) = 0 while w5(2) 6= 0,
and therefore the condition (18) does not hold. Hence
exact incest removal is not possible for this case.
D. Summary
In this section, we have outlined a controlled sensing
problem over a social network in which the administrator
controls (removes) data incest and thereby maintains an
unbiased (fair) online reputation system. The state of
nature could be geographical coordinates of an event (in
a target localization problem) or quality of a social unit
(in an online reputation system). As discussed above,
data incest arises due to the recursive nature of Bayesian
estimation and non-determinism in the timing of the
sensing by individuals. Details of proofs, extensions and
further numerical studies are presented in [57], [70].
IV. INTERACTIVE SENSING FOR QUICKEST CHANGE
DETECTION
In this section we consider interacting social sensors in
the context of detecting a change in the underlying state
of nature. Suppose a multi-agent system performs social
learning and makes local decisions as described in Sec.II.
Given the public beliefs from the social learning proto-
col, how can quickest change detection be achieved? In
other words, how can a global decision maker use the
local decisions from individual agents to decide when
a change has occurred? It is shown below that making
a global decision (change or no change) based on local
decisions of individual agents has an unusual structure
resulting in a non-convex stopping set.
A typical application of such social sensors arises in
the measurement of the adoption of a new product using
a micro-blogging platform like Twitter. The adoption of
the technology diffuses through the market but its effects
can only be observed through the tweets of select indi-
viduals of the population. These selected individuals act
as sensors for estimating the diffusion. They interact and
learn from the decisions (tweeted sentiments) of other
members and therefore perform social learning. Suppose
the state of nature suddenly changes due to a sudden
market shock or presence of a new competitor. The goal
for a market analyst or product manufacturer is to detect
this change as quickly as possible by minimizing a cost
function that involves the sum of the false alarm and
decision delay.
Related works: [26], [27] model diffusion in net-
works over a random graph with arbitrary degree dis-
tribution. The resulting diffusion is approximated using
deterministic dynamics via a mean field approach [71].
In the seminal paper [1], a sensing system for complex
social systems is presented with data collected from cell
phones. This data is used in [1] to recognize social
patterns, identify socially significant locations and in-
fer relationships. In [9], people using a microblogging
service such as Twitter are considered as sensors. In
particular, [9] considers each Twitter user as a sensor
and uses a particle filtering algorithm to estimate the
centre of earthquakes and trajectories of typhoons. As
pointed out in [9], an important characteristic of mi-
croblogging services such as Twitter is that they provide
real-time sensing – Twitter users tweet several times
a day; whereas standard blog users update information
once every several days.
Apart from the above applications in real time sens-
ing, change detection in social learning also arises in
mathematical finance models. For example, in agent
based models for the microstructure of asset prices in
high frequency trading in financial systems [25], the
state denotes the underlying asset value that changes
at a random time τ0. Agents observe local individual
decisions of previous agents via an order book, combine
these observed decisions with their noisy private signals
about the asset, selfishly optimize their expected local
utilities, and then make their own individual decisions
(whether to buy, sell or do nothing). The market evolves
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through the orders of trading agents. Given this order
book information, the goal of the market maker (global
decision maker) is to achieve quickest change point
detection when a shock occurs to the value of the
asset [72].
A. Classical Quickest Detection
The classical Bayesian quickest time detection prob-
lem [73] is as follows: An underlying discrete-time state
process x jump-changes at a geometrically distributed
random time τ0. Consider a sequence of discrete time
random measurements {yk, k ≥ 1}, such that condi-
tioned on the event {τ0 = t}, yk, k ≤ t are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with
distribution B1 and yk, k > t are i.i.d. random variables
with distribution B2. The quickest detection problem
involves detecting the change time τ0 with minimal cost.
That is, at each time k = 1, 2, . . ., a decision uk ∈
{1 (stop and announce change), 2 (continue)} needs to
be made to optimize a tradeoff between false alarm
frequency and linear delay penalty.
To formalize this setup, let P =
[
1 0
1− P22 P22
]
denote the transition matrix of a two state Markov
chain x in which state 1 is absorbing. Then it is easily
seen that the geometrically distributed change time τ0
is equivalent to the time at which the Markov chain
enters state 1. That is τ0 = min{k : xk = 1} and
E{τ0} = 1/(1 − P22). Let τ be the time at which the
decision uk = 1 (announce change) is taken. The goal of
quickest time detection is to minimize the Kolmogorov–
Shiryaev criterion for detection of a disorder [74]:
Jµ(pi0) = dE
µ
pi0{(τ − τ0)+}+ fPµpi0(τ < τ0). (19)
Here x+ = x if x ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. The non-negative
constants d and f denote the delay and false alarm
penalties, respectively. So waiting too long to announce
a change incurs a delay penalty d at each time instant
after the system has changed, while declaring a change
before it happens, incurs a false alarm penalty f . In (19)
µ denotes the strategy of the decision maker. Pµpi0 and
Eµpi0 are the probability measure and expectation of the
evolution of the observations and Markov state which are
strategy dependent. pi0 denotes the initial distribution of
the Markov chain x.
In classical quickest detection, the decision policy
µ is a function of the two-dimensional belief state
(posterior probability mass function) pik(i) = P (xk =
i|y1, . . . , yk, u1, . . . , uk−1), i = 1, 2, with pik(1) +
pik(2) = 1. So it suffices to consider one element,
say pik(2), of this probability mass function. Classical
quickest change detection (see for example [73]) says
that the policy µ∗(pi) which optimizes (19) has the
following threshold structure: There exists a threshold
point pi∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
µ∗(pik) =
{
2 (continue) if pik(2) ≥ pi∗
1 (announce change) if pik(2) < pi∗.
(20)
B. Multi-agent Quickest Detection Problem
With the above classical formulation in mind, consider
now the following multi-agent quickest change detection
problem. Suppose that a multi-agent system performs
social learning to estimate an underlying state according
to the social learning protocol of Sec.II-A. That is, each
agent acts once in a predetermined sequential order
indexed by k = 1, 2, . . . (Equivalently, as pointed out
in the discussion in Sec.II-A, a finite number of agents
act repeatedly in some pre-defined order and each agent
chooses its local decision using the current public belief.)
Given these local decisions (or equivalently the public
belief), the goal of the global decision maker is to mini-
mize the quickest detection objective (19). The problem
now is a non-trivial generalization of classical quickest
detection. The posterior pi is now the public belief given
by the social learning filter (3) instead of a standard
Bayesian filter. There is now interaction between the
local and global decision makers. The local decision ak
from the social learning protocol determines the public
belief state pik via the social learning filter (3), which
determines the global decision (stop or continue), which
determines the local decision at the next time instant,
and so on.
The global decision maker’s policy µ∗ : pi → {1, 2}
that optimizes the quickest detection objective (19) and
the cost Jµ∗(pi0) of this optimal policy are the solution
of “Bellman’s dynamic programming equation”
µ∗(pi) = arg min{fpi(2), d(1− pi(2))
+
∑
a∈A
V (T (pi, a))σ(pi, a)}, Jµ∗(pi0) = V (pi0)
V (pi) = min{fpi(2), d(1− pi(2))
+
∑
a∈A
V (T (pi, a))σ(pi, a)}. (21)
Here T (pi, a) and σ(pi, a) are given by the social learning
filter (3) - recall that a denotes the local decision. V (pi)
is called the “value function” – it is the cost incurred
by the optimal policy when the initial belief state (prior)
is pi. As will be shown the numerical example below,
the optimal policy µ∗(pi) has a very different structure
compared to classical quickest detection.
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C. Numerical Example
We now illustrate the unusual multi-threshold property
of the global decision maker’s optimal policy µ∗(pi)
in multi-agent quickest detection with social learning.
Consider the social learning model of Sec.II-A with
the following parameters: The underlying state is a 2-
state Markov chain x with state space X = {1, 2} and
transition probability matrix P =
[
1 0
0.05 0.95
]
. So the
change time τ0 (i.e., the time the Markov chain jumps
from state 2 into absorbing state 1) is geometrically
distributed with E{τ0} = 1/0.05 = 20.
Social Learning Parameters: Individual agents ob-
serve the Markov chain x in noise with the observation
symbol set Y = {1, 2}. Suppose the observation likeli-
hood matrix with elements Biy = P (yk = y|xk = i) is
B =
[
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
]
. Agents can choose their local actions a
from the action set A = {1, 2}. The state dependent cost
matrix of these actions is c = (c(i, a), i ∈ X, a ∈ A) =[
4.57 5.57
2.57 0
]
. Agents perform social learning with the
above parameters. The intervals [0, pi∗1 ] and [pi
∗
2 , 1] in
Fig.4(a) are regions where the optimal local actions
taken by agents are independent of their observations.
For pi(2) ∈ [pi∗2 , 1], the optimal local action is 2 and
for pi(2) ∈ [0, pi∗1 ], the optimal local action is 1. So
individual agents herd for belief states in these intervals
(see the definition in Sec.II-C) and the local actions do
not yield any information about the underlying state.
Moreover, the interval [0, pi∗1 ] depicts a region where
all agents herd (again see the definition in Sec.II-C),
meaning that once the belief state is in this region, it
remains so indefinitely and all agents choose the same
local action 1.11
Global Decision Making: Based on the local actions of
the agents performing social learning, the global decision
maker needs to perform quickest change detection. The
global decision maker uses the delay penalty d = 1.05
and false alarm penalty f = 3 in the objective function
(19). The optimal policy µ∗(pi) of the global decision
maker where pi = [1−pi(2), pi(2)]′ is plotted versus pi(2)
in Fig.4(a). Note pi(2) = 1 means that with certainty
no change has occurred, while pi(2) = 0 means with
certainty a change has occurred. The policy µ∗(pi) was
computed by constructing a uniform grid of 1000 points
for pi(2) ∈ [0, 1] and then implementing the dynamic
programming equation (21) via a fixed point value
11Note that even if the agent k herds so that its action ak provides
no information about its private observation yk , the public belief still
evolves according to the predictor pik+1 = P ′pik . So an information
cascade does not occur in this example.
iteration algorithm for 200 iterations. The horizontal
axis pi(2) is the posterior probability of no change. The
vertical axis denotes the optimal decision: u = 1 denotes
stop and declare change, while u = 2 denotes continue.
The most remarkable feature of Fig.4(a) is the multi-
threshold behavior of the global decision maker’s op-
timal policy µ∗(pi). Recall pi(2) depicts the posterior
probability of no change. So consider the region where
µ∗(pi) = 2 and sandwiched between two regions where
µ∗(pi) = 1. Then as pi(2) (posterior probability of
no change) increases, the optimal policy switches from
µ∗(pi) = 2 to µ∗(pi) = 1. In other words, the optimal
global decision policy “changes its mind” – it switches
from no change to change as the posterior probability
of a change decreases! Thus, the global decision (stop
or continue) is a non-monotone function of the posterior
probability obtained from local decisions.
Fig.4(b) shows the associated value function obtained
via stochastic dynamic programming (21). Recall that
V (pi) is the cost incurred by the optimal policy with
initial belief state pi. Unlike standard sequential detection
problems in which the value function is concave, the
figure shows that the value function is non-concave and
discontinuous. To summarize, Fig.4 shows that social
learning based quickest detection results in fundamen-
tally different decision policies compared to classical
quickest time detection (which has a single threshold).
Thus making global decisions (stop or continue) based
on local decisions (from social learning) is non-trivial. In
[41], a detailed analysis of the problem is given together
with a characterization of this multi-threshold behavior.
Also more general phase-distributed change times are
considered in [41].
V. COORDINATION OF DECISIONS IN SENSING -
NON-COOPERATIVE GAME APPROACH
The discussion so far has dealt with Bayesian social
learning models for sensing. In this section, we present
a highly stylized non-Bayesian non-cooperative game
theoretic learning approach for adaptive decision making
amongst agents.
Social and economic situations often involve interact-
ing decision making with diverging interests. Decision
makers may act independently or form collaborative
groups wherein enforceable binding agreements ensure
coordination of joint decisions. For instance, a person
may choose the same cellphone carrier as the majority
of family and friends to take advantage of the free talk
times. Social networks diffuse information and hence
facilitate coordination of such cooperative/self-interested
units. This section examines how global coordination of
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Fig. 4. Optimal global decision policy for social learning based
quickest time change detection for geometric distributed change
time. The parameters are specified in Sec.IV-C. The optimal policy
µ∗(pi) ∈ {1 (announce change) , 2 (continue) } is characterized by
a triple threshold – that is, it switches from 1 to 2 three times as
the posterior pi(2) increases. The value function V (pi) is non-concave
and discontinuous in pi. As explained in the text, for pi(2) ∈ [0, pi∗1 ],
all agents herd, while for pi(2) ∈ [pi∗2 , 1] individual agents herd (see
definitions in Sec.II-C).
decisions can be obtained when self interested agents
form a social network.
As mentioned in the Introduction, human-based sens-
ing systems are comprised of agents with partial infor-
mation and it is the dynamic interactions between agents
that is of interest. This motivates the need for game
theoretic learning models for agents interacting in social
networks. Learning dynamics in games typically can be
classified into Bayesian learning, adaptive learning and
evolutionary dynamics. We have already focussed on
Bayesian social learning12 in previous sections of the
paper, and some further remarks are made in Sec.VI on
global Bayesian games.
In this section we focus on adaptive learning where
individual agents deploy simple rule-of-thumb strate-
gies. The aim is to determine if such simple individual
behaviour can result in sophisticated global behaviour.
We are interested in cases where the global behaviour
converges to the set of correlated equilibria.
A. Correlated Equilibria and Related Work
The set of correlated equilibria is a more natural
construct in decentralized adaptive learning environ-
ments than the set of Nash equilibria13, since it allows
for individual players to coordinate their actions. This
12The social learning protocol of Sec.II-A can be viewed as a
Bayesian game comprising a countable number of agents, where each
agent plays once in a specified order to minimize its cost; see [17] for
further details on this game-theoretic interpretation.
13The set of correlated equilibria is defined in (25) below. Nash
equilibria are a special case of correlated equilibria where the joint
strategy is chosen as the product distribution for all players, i.e., all
the agents choose their actions independently.
coordination can lead to higher performance [34] than
if each player chooses actions independently as required
by a Nash equilibrium. As described in [75], it is unrea-
sonable to expect in a learning environment that players
act independently (as required by a Nash equilibrium)
since the common history observed by all players acts
as a natural coordination device.14 The set of correlated
equilibria is also structurally simpler than the set of Nash
equilibria; the set of correlated equilibria is a convex
polytope in the set of randomized strategies whereas
Nash equilibria are isolated points at the extrema of
this set. Indeed, a feasible point in (25) is obtained
straightforwardly by a linear programming solver.
Related works: A comprehensive textbook in game
theoretic learning is [77]. Algorithms for game-theoretic
learning are broadly classified into best response, ficti-
tious play and regret matching. In general it is impossible
to guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium without
imposing conditions on the structure of the utility func-
tions in the game. For supermodular games [78], best re-
sponse algorithms can be designed to converge either to
the smallest or largest Nash equilibrium. Fictitious play
is one of the oldest and best known models of learning
in games; we refer the reader to [79] for convergence of
stochastic fictitious play algorithms. In this section we
focus on regret-matching algorithms. Regret-matching
as a strategy of play in long-run interactions has been
introduced in [75], [76]. In [75], it is proved that when
all agents share stage actions and follow the proposed
regret-based adaptive procedure, the collective behavior
converges to the set of correlated equilibria. In [76],
the authors assumed that agents do not observe others’
actions and proposed a reinforcement learning procedure
that converges to the set of correlated equilibria. More
recently, [80], [81], [37], [38] consider learning in a
dynamic setting where a regret matching type algorithm
tracks a time varying set of correlated equilibria.
B. Regret-Based Decision Making
Consider a non-cooperative repeated game compris-
ing of L agents. Each agent l has a utility function
U l(a1, . . . , aL). Here al denotes the action chosen by
agent l and a−l denote the actions chosen by all agents
excluding agent l. The utility function can be quite
general. For example, [82] considers the case in which
the L agents are organized into M non-overlapping
social (friendship) groups such that agents in a social
14 Hart and Mas-Colell observe in [76] that for most simple adaptive
procedures, “...there is a natural coordination device: the common
history, observed by all players. It is thus reasonable to expect that, at
the end, independence among players will not obtain.”
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group share the same utility function. It could also reflect
reputation or privacy using the models in [49], [50].
Suppose each agent l chooses its actions according
to the following adaptive algorithm running over time
k = 1, 2, . . .:
1) At time k+ 1, choose action alk+1 from probability
mass function ψlk+1, where
ψlk+1 (i) = P
(
alk+1 = i|alk
)
=
 |
rlk(i,j)|+
C , j 6= alk
1−∑j 6=i |rlk(i,j)|+C , j = alk. (22)
Here C is a sufficiently large positive constant so
that ψlk+1 is a valid probability mass function.
2) The regret matrix rlk that determines the pmf ψ
l
k+1
is updated via the stochastic approximation algo-
rithm
rlk (i, j) = r
l
k−1 (i, j) +
1
k
([
U l
(
j, a−lk
)
− U l (alk, a−lk )]I{alk=i} − rlk−1 (i, j)). (23)
Step 1 corresponds to each agent choosing its action
randomly from a Markov chain with transition probabil-
ity ψlk+1. These transition probabilities are computed in
Step 2 in terms of the regret matrix rlk which is the time-
averaged regret agent l experiences for choosing action
i instead of action j for each possible action j 6= i (i.e.,
how much better off it would be if it had chosen action
j instead of i):
rln (i, j) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
[
U l
(
j, a−lk
)− U l (alk, a−lk )] · I{alk=i}.
(24)
The above algorithm can be generalized to consider
multiple social groups. If agents within each social group
share their actions and have a common utility, then they
can fuse their individual regrets into a regret for the
social group. As shown in [82], this fusion of regrets can
be achieved via a linear combination of the individual
regrets where the weights of the linear combination
depend on the reputation of the agents that constitute
the social group.
C. Coordination in Sensing
We now address the following question:
If each agent chooses its action according to
the above regret-based algorithm, what can one
say about the emergent global behavior?
By emergent global behavior, we mean the empirical
frequency of actions taken over time by all agents. For
each L-tuple of actions (al, a−l) define the empirical
frequency of actions taken up to time n as
zn(a
l, a−l) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
I(ak = a
l, a−lk = a
−l).
The seminal papers [75] and [42] show that the
empirical frequency of actions zn converges as n→∞
to the set of correlated equilibria of a non-cooperative
game. Correlated equilibria constitute a generalization of
Nash equilibria and were introduced by Aumann [34].
The set of correlated equilibria Ce is the set of probability
distributions on the joint action profile (al, a−l) that
satisfy
Ce =
{
µ :
∑
a−l
µl(j, a−l)[U l((i, a−l))− U l((j, a−l))]
≤ 0, ∀l, j, i
}
. (25)
Here µl(j, a−l) = P l(al = j, a−l) denotes the ran-
domized strategy (joint probability) of player l choosing
action j and the rest of the players choosing action
a−l. The correlated equilibrium condition (25) states that
instead of taking action j (which is prescribed by the
equilibrium strategy µl(j, a−l)), if player l cheats and
takes action i, it is worse off. So there is no unilateral
incentive for any player to cheat.
To summarize, the above algorithm ensures that all
agents eventually achieve coordination (consensus) in
decision making – the randomized strategies of all agents
converge to a common convex polytope Ce. Step 2 of the
algorithm requires that each agent knows its own utility
and the actions of other agents – but agents do not need
to know the utility functions of other agents. In [76] a
‘blind’ version of this regret-based algorithm is presented
in which agents do not need to know the actions of other
agents. These algorithms can be viewed as examples
in which simple heuristic behavior by individual agents
(choosing actions according to the measured regret)
resulting in sophisticated global outcomes [42], namely
convergence to Ce thereby coordinating decisions.
We refer to [37], [38], [80] for generalizations of the
above algorithm to the tracking case where the step
size for the regret matrix update is a constant. Such
algorithms can track the correlated equilibria of games
with time-varying parameters. Moreover [81] gives suf-
ficient conditions for algorithm to converge to the set
of correlated equilibria when the regrets from agents to
other agents diffuse over a social network.
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VI. CLOSING REMARKS
In this paper we have used social learning as a
model for interactive sensing with social sensors. We
summarize here some extensions of the social learning
framework that are relevant to interactive sensing.
1) Wisdom of Crowds: Surowiecki’s book [83] is an
excellent popular piece that explains the wisdom-of-
crowds hypothesis. The wisdom-of-crowds hypothesis
predicts that the independent judgments of a crowd
of individuals (as measured by any form of central
tendency) will be relatively accurate, even when most
of the individuals in the crowd are ignorant and error
prone. The book also studies situations (such as rational
bubbles) in which crowds are not wiser than individuals.
Collect enough people on a street corner staring at the
sky, and everyone who walks past will look up. Such
herding behavior is typical in social learning.
2) In which order should agents act?: In the social
learning protocol, we assumed that the agents act sequen-
tially in a pre-defined order. However, in many social
networking applications, it is important to optimize the
order in which agents act. For example, consider an on-
line review site where individual reviewers with different
reputations make their reviews publicly available. If a
reviewer with high reputation publishes its review first,
this review will unduly affect the decision of a reviewer
with lower reputation. In other words, if the most senior
agent “speaks” first it would unduly affect the decisions
of more junior agents. This could lead to an increase
in bias of the underlying state estimate.15 On the other
hand, if the most junior agent is polled first, then since its
variance is large, several agents would need to be polled
in order to reduce the variance. We refer the reader to
[85] for an interesting description of who should speak
first in a public debate.16 It turns out that for two agents,
the seniority rule is always optimal for any prior – that
is, the senior agent speaks first followed by the junior
agent; see [85] for the proof. However, for more than
two agents, the optimal order depends on the prior, and
the observations in general.
3) Global Games for Coordinating Sensing: In the
classical Bayesian social learning model of Sec.II, agents
15To quote a recent paper from Haas School of Business, U.C.
Berkeley [84]: “In 94% of cases, groups (of people) used the first
answer provided as their final answer... Groups tended to commit to
the first answer provided by any group member.” People with dominant
personalities tend to speak first and most forcefully “even when they
actually lack competence”.
16As described in [85], seniority is considered in the rules of debate
and voting in the U.S. Supreme Court. “In the past, a vote was taken
after the newest justice to the Court spoke, with the justices voting in
order of ascending seniority largely, it was said, to avoid the pressure
from long-term members of the Court on their junior colleagues.”
act sequentially in time. The global games model that has
been studied in economics during the last two decades,
considers multiple agents that act simultaneously by
predicting the behavior of other agents. The theory of
global games was first introduced in [86] as a tool for
refining equilibria in economic game theory; see [87]
for an excellent exposition. Global games are an ideal
method for decentralized coordination amongst agents;
they have been used to model speculative currency
attacks and regime change in social systems, see [87],
[88], [89].
The most widely studied form of a global game is
a one-shot Bayesian game which proceeds as follows:
Consider a continuum of agents in which each agent i
obtains noisy measurements yi of an underlying state of
nature x. Assume all agents have the same observation
likelihood density p(y|x) but the individual measure-
ments obtained by agents are statistically independent of
those obtained by other agents. Based on its observation
yi, each agent takes an action ai ∈ {1, 2} to optimize
its expected utility E{U(ai, α)|yi}) where α ∈ [0, 1]
denotes the fraction of all agents that take action 2.
Typically, the utility U(1, α) is set to zero.
For example, suppose x (state of nature) denotes the
quality of a social group and yi denotes the measurement
of this quality by agent i. The action ai = 1 means that
agent i decides not to join the social group, while ai = 2
means that agent i joins the group. The utility function
U(ai = 2, α) for joining the social group depends on α,
where α is the fraction of people that decide to join the
group. In [88], the utility function is chosen as follows:
If α ≈ 1, i.e., too many people join the group, then
the utility to each agent is small since the group is too
congested and agents do not receive sufficient individual
service. On the other hand, if α ≈ 0, i.e., too few people
join the group, then the utility is also small since there
is not enough social interaction.
Since each agent is rational, it uses its observation yi
to predict α, i.e., the fraction of other agents that choose
action 2. The main question is: What is the optimal
strategy for each agent i to maximize its expected utility?
It has been shown that for a variety of measurement
noise models (observation likelihoods p(y|x)) and utility
functions U , the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the global game is unique and has a threshold structure
in the observation. This means that given its observation
yi, it is optimal for each agent i to choose its actions as
follows:
ai =
{
1 yi < y∗
2 yi ≥ y∗ (26)
where the threshold y∗ depends on the prior, noise
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distribution and utility function.
In the above example of joining a social group, the
above result means that if agent i receives a measurement
yi of the quality of the group, and yi exceeds a threshold
y∗, then it should join. This is yet another example of
simple local behavior (act according to a threshold strat-
egy) resulting in global sophisticated behavior (Bayesian
Nash equilibrium). As can be seen, global games provide
a decentralized way of achieving coordination amongst
social sensors. In [89], the above one-shot Bayesian
game is generalized to a dynamic (multi-stage) game
operating over a possibly infinite horizon. Such games
facilitate modelling the dynamics of how people join,
interact and leave social groups.
The papers [39], [90] use global games to model
networks of sensors and cognitive radios. In [88] it has
been shown that the above threshold structure (26) for
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, breaks down if the utility
function U(2, α) decreases too rapidly due to congestion.
The equilibrium structure becomes much more complex
and can be described by the following quotation [88]:
Nobody goes there anymore. It’s too crowded
– Yogi Berra
VII. SUMMARY
This paper has considered social learning models for
interaction among sensors where agents use their private
observations along with actions of other agents to esti-
mate an underlying state of nature. We have considered
extensions of the basic social learning paradigm to online
reputation systems in which agents communicate over a
social network. Despite the apparent simplicity in these
information flows, the systems exhibit unusual behavior
such as herding and data incest. Also an example of
social-learning for change detection was considered.
Finally, we have discussed a non-Bayesian formulation,
where agents seek to achieve coordination in decision
making by optimizing their own utility functions - this
was formulated as a game theoretic learning model.
The motivation for this paper stems from under-
standing how individuals interact in a social network
and how simple local behavior can result in complex
global behavior. The underlying tools used in this paper
are widely used by the electrical engineering research
community in the areas of signal processing, control,
information theory and network communications.
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